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CAN THE UNITED STATES TALK THE
TALK & WALK THE WALK WHEN IT
COMES TO LIBEL TOURISM: HOW THE
FREEDOM TO SUE ABROAD CAN KILL
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT HOME
Tara Sturtevant

INTRODUCTION
There is a relatively new legal phenomenon with which legal
scholars, practitioners, and law students alike are not generally
familiar; this new hindrance is called ―libel tourism.‖ The new
phenomenon ultimately eradicates our Constitutionally-protected
First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of the press.
This legal loophole of ―libel tourism‖ refers to ―obtaining libel
judgments in foreign countries where libel laws do not have the free
speech protections‖1 as this country affords, and subsequently
trying to enforce such judgments here in the United States. A
person who is allegedly libeled ―can generally bring suit in any
jurisdiction in which the libelous statement may have been
published.‖2 Due to the rise in ―modern commerce,‖3 such as
technological advances and Internet accessibility worldwide, a
published document has the potential to show up in nearly any
jurisdiction in the world. ―Effectively . . . this means that a libel
plaintiff can choose to sue virtually anywhere the work may have
been sold,‖ with the detrimental effect of stripping ―U.S. authors of
the protections they would have under U.S. law even though the
publication occurred in the United States.‖4 Under doctrines of
Paul H. Aloe, Unraveling Libel Terrorism, 239 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4 (2008).
Id.
3 Id.; see also Raymond W. Beauchamp, England's Chilling Forecast: The
Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from
Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3136 (2006).
4 Aloe, supra note 1, at 4.
1
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reciprocity and comity, the U.S. can enforce foreign judgments that
were rendered in countries that recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments. However, notions of comity espoused by the United
Nations, international treaties, and federal and state legislation,
which blindly enforce libel judgments rendered abroad, or fail to
review them, simply undercut our domestic legal system, libel law,
and our Constitutional right to freedom of speech.
It may be tempting to justify giving preclusive effect to foreign
judgments by citing the important U.S. policy considerations of res
judicata. The most important policies espoused by res judicata,
fairness and consistency, however, fall by the wayside when
American courts tolerate libel tourism. It is neither consistent nor
fair to enforce a libel judgment that would never have been
rendered in any jurisdiction within the United States. Our libel
law is clear, and in the conflict between freedom of speech and
protection of reputation that arises in libel cases, courts often favor
the former.
The First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press are widely recognized and treasured concepts under the
law of the United States. To undercut such by enforcing judgments
that are generally inconsistent with these rights would have grave
and detrimental effects on our citizens. How can we tell American
journalists to report the news and express themselves freely, while
simultaneously allowing a foreign judgment to be enforced against
them? How can we allow laws contrary to our own to be victorious
on our own soil? Congress must be adamant in the protection of its
citizens‘ freedoms afforded by the U.S. Constitution and give U.S.
courts the jurisdiction to review foreign libel judgments, for either
invalidation or enforcement.
Part I of this comment explains the background and
importance of the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
the press under the U.S. Constitution. It also discusses defamation
law in the United States and compares such to defamation laws
abroad. For example, England is one of the prime fora where
defamation plaintiffs are much more likely to prevail than under
U.S. law. Part II will shed some light on libel tourism by discussing
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz,5 a seminal case which subsequently led to
5 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2007). Biz Mahfouz, a Saudi
national, obtained a libel judgment against New York journalist, Ehrenfeld. When
Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment requesting that Mahfouz‘s libel
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New York‘s adoption of section 302(d) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules (―N.Y. C.P.L.R.‖).6 Part III of this comment
discusses the possibility of libel plaintiffs using doctrines of issue
and claim preclusion in the United States after obtaining
judgments abroad. Such res judicata principles cannot properly be
applied to such instances for the same reasons that foreign
judgments cannot be blindly enforced in the United States.
There must be broad jurisdictional power granted to United
States courts to review foreign libel judgments because failure to do
so could result in unlimited international forum shopping. If a libel
plaintiff tries to enforce such a judgment in the United States,
there is no significant prejudice that can result from a United
States court reviewing whether or not the judgment offends the law
of the United States and its notions of justice. If the federal and
state governments adopt legislation similar to section 302(d) of the
N.Y. C.P.L.R., which grants New York courts the jurisdiction to
review libel judgments rendered abroad (even to simply invalidate
the foreign judgment, not only to decide whether it is enforceable),
then consistency, fairness, and the overall American legal system
will not be threatened by the corrosive practice of libel tourism.
This comment concludes by exploring possible solutions to libel

judgment be deemed unenforceable on public policy and constitutional grounds,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
Mahfouz‘s motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. On review, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision that there was no personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz, as he did not
maintain the minimum contacts with New York requisite for the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
6 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008). ―The courts of this state shall have
personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation
proceeding outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New
York or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets
in New York or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the
judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that
person's liability for the judgment, and/or for the purpose of determining whether
said judgment should be deemed non-recognizable . . . to the fullest extent
permitted by the United States constitution, provided: 1. the publication at issue
was published in New York, and 2. that resident or person amenable to
jurisdiction in New York (i) has assets in New York which might be used to satisfy
the foreign defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in New York to
comply with the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of this subdivision
shall apply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation proceedings outside
the United States prior to and/or after the effective date of this subdivision (April
28, 2008).‖ Id.
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tourism, including the amendment to Title 28 of the United States
Code, which has been passed by the House of Representatives and
is awaiting approval in the Senate.7 It is imperative for such
legislation to be approved by the Senate, along with added
jurisdictional power, as the right of free speech is looming in the
balance. Part IV also discusses the perpetuation of terrorism,
which is a frequently overlooked impediment of libel tourism.
Completely dismissing libel foreign judgments may place a strain
on international relations where reciprocity is practiced. Therefore,
by giving American courts jurisdiction to review and a chance to
invalidate those judgments that do not coincide with our law, such
tension may be avoided because the judgment will not be simply
and blindly disregarded due to its foreign nature.
I. WHY IT IS EASIER TO WIN ELSEWHERE: DEFAMATION
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A. Right to Freedom of Speech/Press & U.S. Libel Law
―Congress shall make no law . . . prohibit[ing] the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .‖8
―Freedom of speech and press, historically considered and taken up
by the Federal Constitution, means principally, although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.‖9
The First Amendment is embedded in our legal system primarily to
promote the expression and the dissemination of ideas without the
fear of persecution by the government. The pre-Revolution
colonists, similar to the English, feared prosecution if they
expressed any opinion contrary or offensive to the Crown. As a
primary notion of liberty, the founding fathers intentionally
ensured that free-dom of expression would be an inherent right
granted to all in this newly independent country.
The 18th-century framers of the U.S. Constitution guaranteed
7 H.R. REP. NO. 110-6146 (2008) (This bill, known as the ‗Cohen-Issa libel
tourism bill,‘ . . . will amend U.S. code to prohibit recognition and enforcement of
foreign defamation judgments.) Congressman Steven Cohen, Libel Tourism Bill
Passes,
available
at
http://cohen.house.gov/index.php
option=com_content&task=view&id=639&Itemid=124.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
9 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 454 (2008).
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freedom of the press by writing that protection into the First
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Even so, the Supreme Court of
the United States—the highest court in America—for years refused
to protect the media from libel lawsuits that relied on the First
Amendment. Instead, libel laws varied from state to state without
a single coherent rule in the nation.10
As the country began to develop, the importance of free speech
in a flourishing democratic nation, envisioned by the founding
fathers, began to take hold. Thus, as history shows, freedom of
speech was long protected and supreme in comparison to any rights
and protections of reputation. Today, ―hundreds of libel lawsuits
are filed against newspapers, magazines, and radio and television
stations in the United States.‖11 However, few are successful when
it is clear that a libel defendant‘s First Amendment rights will be
seriously abridged if prevented to express their views freely. One
important motivation behind this protection is to stimulate public
debate, especially concerning politics. Although veracity of the
allegedly libelous statement is presumed, the libel plaintiff has the
opportunity to disprove this presumption. The libel plaintiff has to
prove the falsity of the defamatory statement to prevail; falsity of
the statement is an essential element to a libel claim.12 If falsity is
proved, then freedom of speech is no longer a defense.13 The
Constitution
is
not
intended
to
protect
intentional
misrepresentations or malicious statements about others.
In the United States, ―a communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.‖14 Unlike slander, which is an oral
form of defamation, libel is a written form of defamation which does
not require actual proof of harm to be actionable. Therefore, it may
seem like this is a small hurdle to overcome, and that libel suits
require a low burden of proof for a plaintiff. However, after the
seminal case of N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, the law ―established the

10 Steven Pressman, An Unfettered Press: Libel Law in the United States,
http://usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/libellaw.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2010).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
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Constitutional standard to be applied in libel and defamation
cases.‖15 ―The Supreme Court‘s decision in NY Times Co. v.
Sullivan16 was an expansive decision, making the Court‘s first
constitutional foray into defamation law a bold one.‖17 ―The Court
held that in order for a plaintiff who is a public official to succeed
with a defamation claim against a defendant whose speech is
directed at the plaintiff‘s official duties, the plaintiff must show
with clear and convincing evidence that the speech was made with
‗actual malice,‘ meaning that the defendant had knowledge that the
speech was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth.‖18
NY Times Co. v. Sullivan infused the First Amendment protections
into the standard for determining libel suits. ―Libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitation.‖19
―In actions concerning private figures, the justifications in NY
Times Co. . . . are not as readily applicable.‖20 Because private
figures do not have a public platform to address defamatory
statements or the power to defend against such, private citizens are
given less of a hurdle to cross in a libel suit. All that private figures
have to prove is falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.21
While the First Amendment continues to be a consideration, a
plaintiff who is a public figure has a much greater burden to
overcome in satisfying the aforementioned constitutional
requirements. Private plaintiffs must simply show evidence of the
defamatory statement‘s falsity, while public figures have to show
15 Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed,
14 J.L. & POL‘Y 883, 893 (2006).
16 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When a N.Y. newspaper
published an advertisement concerning grievances, alleged abuses and seeking
support for the movement known as the ―Negro Right to Vote‖ movement, the
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama brought a libel suit against the paper.
When the circuit court, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, entered a
$500,000 judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, claiming that the judgment below
was ―constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of
speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his
official conduct . . . .‖ Id.
17 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3083.
18 Id.
19 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269.
20 Maly, supra note 15, at 895.
21 Id.
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the defendant‘s actual knowledge of its falsity or actual malice to
prevail in a libel action.22 Nevertheless, there is still some
threshold in the United States to prove that the statement was
false and that burden is rightfully placed on the plaintiff (public or
private).
B. Freedom of Speech & Libel Laws Abroad: An Easier Judgment
1. England: The Libel Capital
There are no similar First Amendment protections outside of
the United States, and this is especially true in England. Hence,
free speech abroad is often an afterthought to a more important
and more protected right of reputation.
In England, defamatory statements by their nature are presumed
false. A defendant may, as a defense, plead that his statements were
true and thus justified.
However, to mount this defense, the
defendant must prove the substantial truth of every material fact. A
material fact is defined as anything that ‗adds weight to the
imputation.‘ Proving truth is no simple task.23

Therefore, there is an extremely large burden on the defendant to
unequivocally prove every detail of his statement, which in essence
turns out to be almost impossible in the majority of cases. Hence,
English libel law affords an opportunity to bring a frivolous suit in
a foreign forum, and places a nearly impossible burden in the
hands of a defendant, who would have otherwise had a valid
defense in the United States.
In the United States, the plaintiff has to meet his burden of
proof in order to establish the statement‘s falsity before the burden
shifts to the defendant. This seems to be reasonable, as the one
seeking the relief should initially be required to prove why such
relief should be granted in light of the possibility that the
defendant‘s freedom of speech may be stifled. Although there are
some free speech considerations in the United Kingdom, English
jurisprudence clearly gives more credence to the protection of

22
23

Id. at 897.
Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3078.
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reputation.24 The Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz case demonstrates ―how
the British libel laws are used to circumvent the stricter American
laws.‖25
2. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz
In the recent New York case, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, Rachel
Ehrenfeld sought declaratory relief asking the court to invalidate a
libel default judgment entered against her in England. Dr.
Ehrenfeld‘s book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed-and
How to Stop It, focused on international terrorism, as this was her
specialty and area of expertise.26 In the book, she asserts that the
―defendant . . . Mahfouz (a Saudi Arabian businessman), financier
and former head of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia
. . . provided direct and indirect monetary support to al Qaeda and
other ‗Islamist terrorist groups.‘‖27 The book was published in the
United States; twenty-three copies, however, were purchased in the
United Kingdom and a chapter of the book was accessible on ABC
news‘ website.28 This gave Mahfouz the opportunity to bring a libel
suit in Britain without having to prove Ehrenfeld‘s statements to be
false. Moreover, actual malice or actual knowledge of falsity was
not a consideration to the English court, as the initial burden of
proof was on the defendant, Ehrenfeld, to prove the truth of the
statements in her book. Additionally, free speech concerns were of
little consequence to the English court. Ehrenfeld ―elected not to
appear in the English action [as defendant]. . . because [of] the
costs, . . . the procedural barriers facing a libel defendant under
English law, and her disagreement in principle with the
defendant‘s alleged attempt to chill her speech in New York by
suing in a claimant-friendly libel jurisdiction in which she lacked
any tangible connection.‖29
The English court returned a default judgment for the plaintiff,
Mahfouz, against absent Ehrenfeld in the amount of £10,000
($15,681) intended for Mahfouz and each of his sons.30 Further,
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See generally id.; Maly, supra note 15.
Maly, supra note 15, at 906.
Ehrenfeld, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 833.
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Ehrenfeld was required under the English judgment to give a
public apology to the plaintiff.31 Lastly, the court granted a
permanent injunction against allowing her book, now considered to
be defamatory, to enter England and awarded legal fees to
Mahfouz.32
Ehrenfeld then brought her own action in the States, seeking
―a declaratory judgment that, under federal and New York law,
defendant could not prevail on a libel claim against her based upon
the statements at issue in the English action and that the . . .
default judgment is unenforceable in the United States and,
particularly, in New York State.‖33
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately decided that they
would first need personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz to consider
Ehrenfeld‘s claim.34 Libel tourism was not an issue that they
wanted to address if personal jurisdiction was lacking, and
ultimately the court found that under International Shoe35 and its
progeny, there were not enough meaningful or minimum contacts
with New York to warrant jurisdiction over Mahfouz.36 ―The Court
was unmoved that free speech principles were involved, that the
defendant had owned condominiums in New York City or that he
had been indicted by a grand jury and was a defendant in several
civil actions arising out of the September 11th terrorist attacks.‖37
Therefore, Ehrenfeld‘s claim was dismissed based on lack of
personal jurisdiction, and the court swept the issue of libel tourism
under the carpet.
Although the New York Court failed to
invalidate the judgment based on jurisdictional grounds, the
English judgment could not actually be enforced in New York

Ehrenfeld, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
Id.
33 Id.
34 See generally id.
35 See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
(When the Defendant, a company based in Delaware, failed to pay unemployment
to the State of Washington, the courts ultimately concluded that Washington had
personal jurisdiction over the matter, because the defendants had ―minimum
contacts‖ with the State to warrant in personam jurisdiction. The court developed
the minimum contacts test to determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction
over a litigant).
36 See generally Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2007).
37 Paul H. Aloe, 2006-2007 Survey of New York Law: Article: Civil Practice, 58
SYRACUSE L. REV. 713, 742 (2008).
31
32
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unless Mahfouz sued to domesticate it in New York.38 Although
Mahfouz did not try to enforce the judgment in New York, speech
was chilled nonetheless, as Ehrenfeld‘s United Kingdom publisher
promptly ceased publication of her book in the United Kingdom
based on the English judgment. Therefore, New York‘s failure to
invalidate the judgment was indeed harmful to Ehrenfeld and free
expression generally. However, ―the story did not end there . . .
because the case drew a reaction from the New York Legislature in
the form of the so-called ‗Libel Terrorism Bill.‘‖39
3. N.Y.‘s Response to Ehrenfeld; The Libel Terrorism Bill
The court decided in Ehrenfeld that section 302 of the N.Y.
C.P.L.R. did not confer jurisdiction to New York, in order to declare
a British libel judgment invalid. Following this decision, section
302 was amended to create an expansive long arm statute allowing
―nonrecognition of certain foreign libel judgments.40
The Libel Terrorism Protection Act . . . creates a specific
ground for nonrecognition of such judgments. This new subdivision
. . . provides:
(d) Foreign defamation judgment. The courts of this state shall have
personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a
defamation proceeding outside the United States against any
person who is a resident of New York or is a person or entity
amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets in New York
or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the
judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with
respect to that person‘s liability for the judgment, and/or for the
purpose of determining whether said judgment should be deemed
non-recognizable pursuant to section fifty-three hundred four of this
chapter, to the fullest extent permitted by the United States
Constitution, provided:1) the publication at issue was published in
New York, and 2) that resident or person amenable to jurisdiction
in New York (i) has assets in New York which might be used to
satisfy the foreign defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take
actions in New York to comply with the foreign defamation

38
39
40

Id. at 743.
Aloe, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
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judgment.‖41

In addition to giving New York long arm jurisdiction to deal
with matters described above, The Libel Terrorism Act also amends
New York‘s version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act of 2005, section 5304 of the N.Y.
C.P.L.R. Before the amendment, ―[the New York] Court of Appeals
mandated that . . . foreign judgments are generally to be
recognized, even where the underlying cause of action is not one
that would give rise to relief in New York.‖42 However, section
5304(b)(8) now:
[P]ermits nonrecognition where the cause of action resulted in a
defamation judgment obtained in a jurisdiction outside the
United States, unless the court before which the matter is
brought sitting in this state first determines that the defamation
law applied in the foreign court‘s adjudication provided at least as
much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as
would be provided by both the United States and New York
constitutions.43

Reciprocity has long been a requirement of enforcing a foreign
judgment in the United States. The late nineteenth century
Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot, held that the United States
would not enforce foreign judgments from countries that did not
extend the same courtesy.
[J]udgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign
country, by the laws of which our own judgments are
reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima
facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs‘ claim. 44

However, this requirement has almost become moot. Since almost
all developed nations have reciprocity with the United States today,
the question now becomes whether the foreign judgment is
repugnant to our legal system and therefore should not be enforced.
Reciprocity can never be dispositive in determining foreign
judgment enforcement.
41
42
43
44

Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008).
Aloe, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2008).
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123 (1895).
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Although under principles of reciprocity and comity,
recognition of foreign judgments may seem fair and conducive to a
working relationship between nations, libel tourism is an
illustration of how this courtesy can be abused. Without the type of
legislation enacted in New York, litigants can go to a foreign nation
This offers an
where libel is often a strict liability tort.45
opportunity for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping by bringing a
suit in another country in order to make an ―end run‖ around the
First Amendment.46 There are countries other than England that
allow for such behavior. For example, ―Singapore has been called a
‗libel paradise,‘ and New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan, and Australia are
also noted for being friendly to plaintiffs.‖47 ―So many options for
the libel tourist only heighten the problem, as well as the demand
for an American solution.‖48
4. Singapore: A Libel Paradise
Singapore is called a ―libel paradise‖ for a good reason. A
defamation suit usually leads to a prompt settlement, rarely
reaching litigation, because the defendants know that defending a
defamation suit in Singapore is virtually a sure defeat. In 2002,
Singapore‘s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong, and Lee‘s eldest son, Deputy Prime Minister, all
brought a libel suit against the United States business news wire
Bloomberg.49 The subject of the alleged libel was an article written
by a Bloomberg contributor regarding concerns of nepotism after
Lee appointed his daughter-in-law to a high government position.50
It was only a mere three weeks from the time the article was
published to the time that the parties settled.51 This was one of the
speediest settlements ever recorded. Bloomberg seemed to be
cognizant of the long history of victorious defamation lawsuits
45 Michael F. Sutton, Legislating the Tower of Babel: International Restrictions
on Internet Content and the Marketplace of Ideas, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 417, 422
(2004).
46 Id.
47 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3076.
48 Id.
49 Eric Ellis, Singapore Authorities Use Libel Laws to Silence Critics,
AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 26, 2002,
http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020926
au.htm.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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brought primarily by Singapore‘s leaders. ―Foreign publishers have
spent millions in fruitless attempts to defend libel actions brought
against titles that have earned an international reputation for
accuracy and credibility . . . no foreign publisher has ever
successfully defended a libel action in a Singapore court when
opposing a Singapore politician.‖52 However, the article in the
Bloomberg matter was never published in Singapore, it only
appeared on Bloomberg‘s website.53 Bloomberg employed 180
persons in Singapore and had over 3000 subscribers that it did not
want to lose.54 Bloomberg‘s acquiescence to Singapore‘s libel haven
was understandable considering its economic interests in
Singapore. However, the article that was the center of the dispute
was removed from their website, chilling any expression of
opposition or concern over the affairs of Singapore‘s ruling party.
As a result, another haven for libel tourists continues to quiet
American speech.
5. Australia: Another Easy Judgment
Australia and the United States share their legal roots in
English common law; however, they have diverged onto two distinct
paths when it comes to defamation law.55 The battle between
freedom of speech, reputation, and privacy plays out differently in
Australia than in the United States. Australia holds ―reputational
and privacy interests‖56 in higher regard than free speech. The
difference may be attributed to the fact that the First Amendment
rights afforded by the United States Constitution explicitly
safeguard free speech, while Australia has no such constitutional
safeguard.
Also, Australian defamation law does not have ―anything
comparable to the requirement in the United States that public
figures suing for defamation demonstrate that the defendant acted
‗with actual malice‘—that is, with knowledge that the defamatory
statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was

Id.
Id.
54 Ellis, supra note 49.
55 Michael Newcity, The Sociology of Defamation in Australia and the United
States, 26 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
56 Id. at 4.
52
53
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false or not.‖57 Australian lawmakers defend this lack of a special
requirement for public figures by arguing that it would be unjust to
add an extra burden to those in the public eye, simply because of
their status.58 Due to the fact that ―Australia is a commonwealth
organized under the authority of the British monarchy,‖59 the
falsity of the alleged libelous statement is presumed, which places
the burden on the defendant of a libel suit to prove veracity.60
The 2001 Australian case of Gutnick v. Dow Jones61 is a prime
example of how libel tourism works. Gutnick, an Australian
entrepreneur, obtained a libel judgment against Dow Jones for
alleged defamatory information that appeared on the Wall Street
Journal‘s website, of which many subscribers were from
Australia.62 Dow Jones appealed to the High Court of Australia,
contending that Australia‘s libel laws chilled American notions of
free speech and that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
matter. The High Court responded by affirming the libel judgment,
reasoning that the Internet allowed for Australian subscriptions
and that ―common law adapts even to radically different
environments,‖63 such as the World Wide Web. Since the Internet
was allowing for the dissemination of Dow Jones‘s articles in
Australia, then Dow Jones could rightfully be bound by the laws of
Australia. Now, what happens when foreign libel plaintiffs try to
enforce their judgments in the United States?

Id. at 3 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
Id.
59 Blake Cooper, The U.S. Libel Law Conundrum and the Necessity of
Defensive Corporate Measures in Lessening International Internet Libel Liability,
21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 139 (2005).
60 Id.
61 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html. ―Joseph Gutnick, an
Australian international entrepreneur with business connections in the U.S., sued
Dow Jones, publisher of Barron's Magazine, a financial publication focused mainly
on developments in the U.S. markets, in Victoria, Australia, over the content of an
article . . . which alleged Mr. Gutnick was the chief customer of Nachum Goldberg,
a convicted tax-evading money launderer, and that Gutnick also had evaded taxes
and laundered money through Goldberg, using his influence with Goldberg to buy
Goldberg's silence.‖ Cooper, supra note 59, at 141-42.
62 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.). available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html.
63 Id. ¶ 90; see also Kurt Wimmer, Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of
Expression, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 207 (2006).
57
58
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C. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The doctrine of comity64 has been followed in the United States
common law for many years. ―Foreign judgments are deemed to be
‗valid‘ if the foreign court properly asserted personal jurisdiction
and if the foreign tribunal utilized procedures that were not
―If these conditions are met, the
fundamentally unfair.‖65
Restatement instructs that the foreign judgment should be enforced
unless ‗the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
sought.‘‖66 This is considered to be the public policy exception to
enforcement of foreign judgments. Further, the United States is a
party to the Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, an international treaty which goes
beyond foreign judgments and allows for reciprocal members to
enforce arbitral awards country to country.67 While these treaties
and laws seem to promote uniformity and recognition across
borders, there are still limitations. ―‗Comity,‘ in the legal sense, is
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.‖68
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. 69

Section 4 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act of 2005, gives a list of limitations on foreign

64 Comity is ―a practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of
different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive,
and judicial acts.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004).
65 Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88
MINN. L. REV. 783, 792 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §
92(1971)).
66 Id.
67 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force in the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970), available at http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII1&chapter=22&lang=en#EndDec.
68 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
69 Id.
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judgment enforcement. Grounds for non-recognition of a foreign
judgment are as follows:
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to defend; (2) the foreign-country judgment was
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate
opportunity to present its case; (3)
the foreign-country
judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the
foreign-country judgment is based is repugnant to the public
policy of this state or of the United States; (4) the foreigncountry judgment conflicts with another final andconclusive
judgment; (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary
to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute
in question was to be determined otherwise than by
proceedings in that foreign court; (6) in the case of jurisdiction
based only on personal service, the foreign court was a
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action; (7) the
foreign-country judgment was rendered in circumstances that
raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering
court with respect to the foreign-country judgment; or (8) the
specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the foreigncountry judgment was not compatible with the requirements of
due process of law.70

Many factors of non-recognition could have been found in the
Ehrenfeld case. Nevertheless, the general majority of libel tourism
cases fall within the third limitation of the act, which does not hold
a judgment viable for recognition if the cause or claim is repugnant
to public policy. The fora where libel tourists shop often presume
falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement, as discussed above,
which in essence creates a presumption of guilt that is extremely
difficult to overcome. Furthermore, the protections of the First
Amendment and admiration for free speech are not shared by these
frequently shopped nations. Procedural rules and evidentiary rules
are also not aligned with the United States. The foregoing reasons
illustrate the distaste and incompatibility such foreign libel
judgments exude from our domestic libel law—a general
repugnance. Therefore, a foreign plaintiff has a great opportunity
70 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c) (2005)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ufmjra62.pdf.
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to obtain a libel judgment from an American defendant abroad.
II. RES JUDICATA
A libel plaintiff may try to enforce a foreign libel judgment in
the United States through principles of res judicata if the court
refuses to enforce such a judgment based on the non-recognition
factors listed in section 4(c) of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act. Professor Jay Carlisle describes the
doctrine of res judicata as referring to:
[A] variety of concepts dealing with the preclusive effects of a
judgment on subsequent litigation. Claim preclusion is the
doctrine that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all
other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or
if seeking a different remedy. Issue preclusion basically
precludes a party from re-litigating in a subsequent action or
proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or
proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity,
whether the tribunals or causes of action are the same. Its
typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil
action argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or
more issues determined in an earlier civil action between the
same parties in the same jurisdiction.71

These principles have been used by foreign litigants in United
States courts trying to give preclusive effect to issues already
litigated in a foreign country. In 1999, the case of Smith v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank gave a Canadian judgment preclusive
effect in the Tenth Circuit.72 The court contended that there was
―no reason why the two Canadian judgments, which decided the
parties‘ rights concerning the two underlying mortgages, should be
71 Jay Carlisle, Second Circuit 1999-2000 Res Judicata Developments, 20
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75, 76 (2000).
72 Smith v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, No. 98-4008, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1184,
at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999). Smith, the plaintiff, held a mortgage with the
defendant, a Canadian bank, for a Canadian condominium that plaintiff owned.
Id. In 1994, the bank brought suit in Toronto, Canada for delinquent payments on
the mortgage. Id. A default judgment was entered against Smith in the Toronto
court. Id. In this case, Smith brought suit for wrongful foreclosure on the
mortgage, and the lower court, affirmed here, granted summary judgment for the
defendants based on the 1994 Canadian judgment that decided the issue of
foreclosure and payment delinquency against Smith. Id.
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denied recognition in this case.‖73 The court stated, however, that
issue preclusion can only apply if ―Utah law would recognize a
judgment rendered by a Canadian court.‖74 In its analysis, the
court cited Hilton v. Guyot:
[T]he principles of comity require recognition of a foreign
judgment if there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in
the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting,
or fraud in procuring the judgment.75

Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff had a full and fair
opportunity to be heard in the Canadian proceeding and gave
recognition to the Canadian judgment and its preclusive effect on
the United States case.
It is clear from the court‘s analysis that in order to give a
foreign judgment preclusive effect in the United States, that
judgment must be recognizable by United States courts under the
doctrine of comity and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act. In other words, recognition of a
judgment is a prerequisite to giving it preclusive effect. A foreign
litigant cannot try to use res judicata principles when a foreign
judgment is repugnant to U.S. law, or when an American defendant
is deprived of due process considerations. An issue of liability
under a libel claim may turn on different facts in different fora. For
example, if Mahfouz was to bring suit in the U.S., as opposed to
England, the fact that he was a public official would place a heavier
burden on him to prove actual malice on the part of Ehrenfeld.
Therefore, the issue turned on different facts and subsequent
burden of proof specific to English law, hence, cannot be given the
same effect in this country. ―To be entitled to any recognition, then,
the foreign court‘s proceedings must have comported with
American ideas of fundamental fairness, including our concept of
73
74
75

Id. at *16.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895)).
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the permissible bases for personal jurisdiction.‖76
In 1992, New York Supreme Court refused to give recognition
or preclusive effect to an English libel judgment in the case of
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.77 Although this was a
case of first impression in New York, the Supreme Court held that
they were not able to enforce or give any weight to the English
judgment, due to the fact that it did not ―comport with the
constitutional standards for adjudicating libel claims.‖78 Moreover,
it was determined that the standards used by the High Court of
England did not meet the safeguards of the right to freedom of
speech or freedom of the press available in the United States.79
Under English law, any published statement, which adversely
affects a person‘s reputation or the respect in which that person is
held, is prima facie defamatory.80 ―A plaintiff‘s only burden is to
establish that the words complained of that refer to them, were
published by the defendant, and bear a defamatory meaning . . . .‖81
Statements of fact are to be presumed false and the defendant must
plead justification for the issue of truth to be brought before the
jury.82
In the United States, the burden of proving truth is not placed
on the libel defendant; rather, the burden of proving falsity of the
statement is placed on the plaintiff. To do otherwise, or to follow
English libel law, would be considered ―unconstitutional, because
fear of liability may deter‖83 free speech. Such a chilling of free
speech would be accomplished by enforcing English libel judgments
in the United States, and the court would decide that the
76 Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose
Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 71 (1984).
77 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). The (libel)
―judgment was granted in an action brought in the High Court of Justice in
London, England, by an Indian national against the New York operator of a news
service which transmits reports only to a news service in India. The story held to
be defamatory was written by a reporter in London, wired by defendant to the
news service in India, which sent it to newspapers there. It was reported in two
Indian newspapers, copies of which were distributed in the United Kingdom.‖ Id.
at 661.
78 Id. at 662.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 663.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.

19

288

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 22:1

―protection of free speech and the press embodied in . . . [the First]
[A]mendment [of the United States Constitution] would be
seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments
granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but
considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the
US Constitution.‖84
III. ENDING THE TOURISM
A. The Cohen-Issa Libel Tourism Bill
The Ehrenfeld case prompted New York to act by extending
New York‘s long-arm statute, but one state‘s endeavor seems to be
a miniscule victory in the larger jurisdictional scheme of the
country.
As a step in the right direction, the House of Representatives,
led by Tennessee‘s Ninth District Representative, Steve Cohen,
recently passed the ―Cohen-Issa Libel Tourism Bill‖ (hereinafter
―the Libel Tourism bill‖). This bill has enjoyed bipartisan support
and passed unanimously in fall of 2008.85 Ratification is now
pending in the U.S. Senate. The bill will amend Title 28 of the
United States Code (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) to ―prohibit
recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.‖86
The legislative findings were as follows:
(1) The [F]irst amendment of the Constitution of the United
States prohibits the abridgment of freedom of speech.
(2)
Freedom of speech is fundamental to the values of American
democracy. (3) In light of the constitutional protection our
Nation affords to freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has
modified the elements of the common law tort of defamation to
provide more protection for defendants than would be available
at common law, including providing special protections
for
political speech. (4) The courts of other countries, including
those that otherwise share our Nation‘s common law and due
process traditions, are not constrained by the first amendment
and thus may provide less protection to defamation defendants

84
85
86

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 110-6146 (2008).
Id.
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than our Constitution requires. (5) While our Nation‘s courts
will generally enforce foreign judgments as a matter of comity,
comity does not require that courts enforce foreign judgments
that are repugnant to our Nation‘s fundamental constitutional
values, in particular its strong protection of the
right
to
freedom of speech. (6) Our Nation‘s courts should only enforce
foreign judgments as a matter of comity when such foreign
judgments are consistent with the right to freedom of speech.87

These findings are consistent with most of the concerns
expressed in this comment. The foregoing concerns have thankfully
prompted Congress to action, and hopefully the Senate will ratify
this legislation. If ratified, this bill will essentially amend Chapter
181 ―Foreign Judgments‖ of Title 28 of the United States Code, as
follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a
domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment
for defamation that is based upon a publication concerning a
public figure or a matter of public concern unless the domestic
court determines that the foreign judgment is consistent with
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.88

This ratification will notably give the United States‘ courts the
power to refuse to enforce damages against defendants who are
faced with libel suits similar to the defendant in Ehrenfeld.
However, the bill only concerns public figures and matters of public
concern. Therefore, defendants cannot use this proposed legislation
to escape foreign libel judgments where the plaintiff is a private
figure. This does not warrant much discussion because it is an
improbable or rare circumstance that would lead to such a case.
Unlike public figures, private libel claimants usually find their
allegedly defamatory statements published locally rather than
abroad. The situations that would allow a private libel plaintiff to
sue abroad are too remote to warrant discussion in this comment.
However, the more tangible problem with the Libel Tourism
bill lies in the fact that it has not yet been passed and the potential
for presidential veto (if and when it is ratified by the Senate) has
risen since January 20, 2009 and after President Barack Obama
87
88

Id. § 1(a).
Id. § 2.
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has taken office. President Obama was widely criticized during his
presidential campaign for implementing a police force in Missouri
during the final days leading up to the 2008 Presidential Election.
This police force was said to be ordered to ―threaten libel
prosecutions against Obama‘s political opposition‖ if anyone was to
speak out against Obama in a misleading or false way.89 Free
speech activists and many of the conservative Obama opposition
point out that free speech and free press is the cornerstone of
politics and freedom.90 Open public debate is to be encouraged,
even if it calls for public questioning of candidates running for the
most powerful position in the country. If libel suits are used to
threaten any political opposition that may question a candidate‘s
views and background, then free speech will be stifled. Hence,
there is a good possibility that if the President holds reputation and
conformity in higher regard than free speech, the Libel Tourism bill
may never leave the President‘s desk.
As the law stands today, the individual states, most of which
have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act, have the discretion to enforce a foreign libel
judgment based on the policy consideration exception in the Act,
supra. Therefore, the Libel Tourism bill only creates a national
recognition of an existing law, which is already in force in various
individual states.91 This bill identifies ―the principles that guide
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments and
attempts to create a national solution in the form of a coherent
federal statute.‖92 The American Law Institute and other legal
scholars feel that this national recognition is necessary and more
―precise‖ than the already existing state laws.93 In effect, however,
it stands almost identical to already existing state laws that
address the enforcement of foreign judgments. Therefore, while

89 Andrew C. McCarthy, Obama’s Assault on the First Amendment, NAT‘L REV.
ONLINE,
Oct.
1,
2008,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=M2MxMW
JlNzcwMDU3ZTJkYjRmZjU3N2U0OGNlZmE1ZDg=&w=MA==.
(McCarthy
admonishes Obama – ―The Prophet of Change is only to be admired, not
questioned.‖).
90 Id.
91 Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6146 (2009) (statement of
Linda J. Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, N.Y.U).
92 Id.
93 Id.
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national awareness is extremely important and provides a step in
the right direction, national legislation is still lacking a cohesive
element that would adequately combat libel tourism.
B. Proposed Legislation is Lacking: What Needs to be Done
1. The Greatest Overlooked Concern of Libel Tourism: Terrorism
While the words tourism and terrorism look and sound
extremely similar, it was no mistake when New York named their
anti-libel tourism act the ―Libel Terrorism Bill.‖ Terrorism has its
long claws deeply embedded into free speech. Most of the Middle
East does not recognize freedom of expression, and radical Islamistassociated terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, will try to quell the
disturbances resulting from free speech concerning their
organizations.
There are many wealthy Middle Eastern
businessmen who share the same fundamentalist views with the
same types of terrorists, or even the same terrorists, that attacked
For example,
the United States on September 11, 200194.
Ehrenfeld tried to expose those who financially fund terrorism,
such as Saudi businessman, Mahfouz. Mahfouz once ran the
largest bank in Saudi Arabia and had connections with the royal
family of Saudi Arabia. ―There is no freedom of expression in Saudi
Arabia, so it is the duty of others to expose what is happening.
With the help of British libel lawyers, Mr. Mahfouz has launched
thirty-three suits against those who are investigating this
important area of public concern.‖95
When power and money meet terror and hate, the result is a
catastrophe, as evidenced by the September 11, 2001 attack. One
of the most patriotic acts occurs when a journalist does his job, ―a
job that is defined and defended by the First Amendment . . . posing
questions, raising concerns, exposing mistakes, and voicing dissent
are . . . essential to the national interest . . . .‖96 It is difficult to
94 Dore Gold, The Saudi State and Terrorism, MIDDLE E. FORUM, Apr. 4, 2003,
http://www.meforum.org/537/the-saudi-state-and-terrorism.
95 Dominic Kennedy, MPs Accuse Courts of Allowing Libel Tourism; Britain
'Being Used for Soviet-style Censorship’, TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 2008, at 27,
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ law/article5362364.ece.
96 Steven V. Roberts, Patriot and Professionals: Journalists as Responsible
Citizens, in RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC SAFETY AFTER 9/11; AMERICA IN THE AGE OF
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disagree that an essential national and international interest is to
uncover and combat terrorism. One way to accomplish this end is
to cut off the financial support to groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas,
and the Taliban. This starts with indentifying the wealthy and
powerful men and women behind terrorist organizations. Without
funding, terrorism would cease to exist. If the money sources are
investigated, unveiled, and stopped, the likelihood of terrorist
attacks would decrease.
English courts have been criticized by their own law
enforcement agencies ―of using ‗Soviet-style‘ English libel laws to
help the rich and powerful to hide their secrets.‖97 An example is
―the British-Iraqi businessman Nadhmi Auchi, who has a
conviction for corruption in France and is linked to a fundraiser for
Barack Obama, was accused of using the [English libel] law to stifle
debate.‖98 Like Mahfouz, this is just another instance of a Saudi
official trying to silence existing reports of his actions, while
probably still funding terrorism.99
―The chilling effect of
international libel suits is not limited to the publication of
information, but could also extend further to the investigative
process. The effect of these judgments could discourage other
scholars from investigating terrorism funding or mentioning such
individuals as Mr. Mahfouz by name.‖100 ―The media is a part of
the intelligence process, and they can only fulfill their role as
investigators with the support of the government and the law.‖101
2. United States Jurisdiction to Invalidate Foreign Libel
Judgments
Some may argue that libel defendant Rachel Ehrenfeld never
suffered any actual harm because Mahfouz never tried to enforce
his English judgment in the United States. However, more is to be
said of the power to invalidate judgments, even in a similar
situation such as Ehrenfeld‘s.
The new Libel Tourism bill
(awaiting ratification by the Senate) appears to provide the answer
TERRORISM 77 (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003).
97 Id. at 77.
98 Id.
99 Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3076.
100 Maly, supra note 15, at 934.
101 Id. at 935 (citing GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW 35
(4th ed. 2002)).
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to all problems resulting from libel tourism. If the foreign
judgment is not consistent with the First Amendment, then it will
not be enforced in the United States. However, there remains an
unaddressed problem within the Libel Tourism bill because the bill
does not speak of invalidating judgments, even when said
judgments are not sought to be enforced in the United States.
At first glance, the power to invalidate foreign judgments may
seem like overreaching, but libel tourism will only be fully
addressed when United States courts are given the jurisdiction to
hear claims for declaratory relief seeking to invalidate foreign
judgments. Even if a foreign judgment is not sought to be enforced
in the United States, it does not necessarily mean that the chilling
effects on free speech do not remain. In turn, because Ehrenfeld‘s
book was essentially ―blacklisted‖ from England, there is a bleak
possibility for future publications by the same publisher. ―In her
complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld
claimed that ‗[i]f this action is dismissed, writers will be afraid to
do their jobs properly and aggressively, and the search for the truth
behind issues of the highest and most urgent public interest will be
compromised.‘‖102 ―In the amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf
of Dr. Ehrenfeld to the New York court, several members of the
media and international communities jointly contended that[,]
should the British judgment be allowed to stand, the impact would
be felt by numerous authors and publishers alike by giving effect
and credibility to the tactics of ‗libel tourists‘ such as Mahfouz.‖103
Therefore, it appears that the effects of an unenforced judgment
may be great. Such judgments serve as deterrents to all other
journalists from writing freely. And for those that continue to
write, the publishers are going to be circumspect of any material
they publish that can subject them to a lawsuit. For example,
Cambridge University Press decided to scrap publishing plans for a
book about jihad and radical Islam, because of fear of a libel action
in English courts, ―which seem at the moment to side with those
who finance extremism rather than those who seek to curb it.‖104

102 Maly, supra note 15, at 934 (referencing the Memorandum of Law
submitted to the New York Supreme Court on behalf of Ehrenfeld).
103 Id. (quoting Brief for Amazon.com et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y
Mar. 23, 2005)).
104 Kennedy, supra note 9.
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England is not a remote country, and many publishers have offices
and investments in England. Therefore, they will not risk having
their assets attached in a libel suit in order to publish material that
will likely invite claims for libel. In effect, the fear of libel suits not
only chills free speech, but also freezes freedom of speech in its
entirety.
Personal jurisdiction, as espoused by International Shoe and its
progeny, is not sufficient in matters concerning libel tourism. If the
courts are unable to establish that the defendant at issue
maintained minimum contacts with the state, then the court will
dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although it could
be argued that Mahfouz‘s ownership of condominiums in New York
City constituted minimum contacts to warrant jurisdiction, the
Court disagreed. This is explicitly why the Libel Tourism bill,
currently being reviewed by the Senate, is incomplete and needs to
include a long arm jurisdictional element, as the New York‘s Libel
Terrorism Protection Act does. The New York statute states:
The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction over
any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding
outside the United States against any person who is a resident
of New York or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in
New York who has assets in New York or may have to take
actions in New York to comply with the judgment.105

This exemplifies the precise language needed yet currently lacking
in the bill pending in the Senate. Therefore, personal jurisdiction
will be effectively asserted over the person who holds a libel
judgment if the court has personal jurisdiction over the party
against whom the judgment is rendered. There is nothing unjust in
declaring that if libel plaintiffs want to sue and obtain a judgment
against an American defendant, then such plaintiffs must be
prepared to have an American court review the judgment. By
expanding the reach to obtain personal jurisdiction, chilled speech
will begin to thaw and foreign judgments repugnant to our
constitutionally protected rights will be rightfully invalidated.
Recently, other advocates for jurisdictional changes on a
federal level to combat libel tourism believe that the legislation
must be narrow and not lean toward a broad long-arm sweep. Such

105

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2008).
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arguments are based upon the concern for overreaching and
negative impacts on foreign relations. Todd W. Moore of Fordham
Law School recently advocated that Congress should start with a
statute similar to New York‘s Libel Terrorism bill and add the
―effects test‖ to the jurisdictional requirement. Moore argues for a
seemingly ―long-arm type‖ of legislation, and adds a minimum
contacts test. The ―effects test,‖ espoused in Calder v. Jones, is
essentially the minimum contacts test for defamation suits.106 It
provides that when a defamation action is brought, the work had to
not only be published in the state to have jurisdiction, but also
required that the harm from the allegedly defamatory statements
must have had its primary effect in that state.107 However, adding
the effects test to federal or state long-arm statutes simply
undercuts the effectiveness of a long-arm statute. The purpose of
such a statute is to ―extend‖ jurisdictional reach to grab a
defendant who otherwise would not be subject to personal
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test.
Furthermore, Mr. Moore believes that review of libel foreign
judgments should be limited to assessing enforcement only and
should never invalidate such a judgment.108 He defends this
position by stating that:
Absent an international consensus on jurisdiction regarding
unenforced foreign defamation judgments, the most the United
States can do is protect its citizens within its own borders
without unduly interfering with foreign sovereignties. Given
the legal variations between countries, the different standards
used to enforce judgments from other nations, and the resulting
difficulties in predicting foreign countries‘ enforcement of U.S.
laws, the most a U.S. court system can do to cull the reluctance
to publish facilitated by foreign lawsuits is grant U.S. parties
the power to vindicate their domestic rights. 109

Yet, to fully vindicate one‘s domestic rights, invalidation of
such a foreign libel judgment must be an option for a United States
court. Rachel Ehrenfeld experienced the chilling effects on her

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Todd W. Moore, Untying Our Hands: The Case for Uniform Personal
Jurisdiction over “Libel Tourists”, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3225 (2009).
108 Id. at 3247-48.
109 Id. at 3248-49.
106
107
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work when United Kingdom publishers recalled her book.
Although Mahfouz never tried to enforce his judgment here in the
United States, his judgment placed enough fear on publishers
abroad to make them cut into Ehrenfeld‘s free expression and
―wallet.‖ As discussed in the onset of subsection III.B.2, supra,
without the power to invalidate a repugnant foreign libel judgment,
the court will not effectively support the First Amendment and will
not limit those who attempt to stifle free speech.
CONCLUSION
―If the Freedom of Speech is taken away, then dumb and silent
we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.‖110 Our founding
fathers knew that the freedom to express oneself, the freedom to
promote debate, and stir emotion and thought in others, were the
cornerstones of a flourishing democratic society. Furthermore, the
old adage that ―the pen is mightier than the sword‖ still holds
weight in a society where corruption, hate, greed, and clear motives
to destroy others pervade many of the world‘s rich and powerful
figures. In many cases, the only way to counter such grave forces is
by revealing the truth to the public. In no instance shall false
representation about a person be tolerated, and libel suits are
warranted when falsity can be shown. However, libel tourism
protects primarily those who have something to hide; those who
would likely fail in a libel suit in the United States. Congress is on
the right path to protect United States citizens with the new Libel
Tourism bill. United States courts, however, need to have broad
long-arm jurisdiction to review all libel judgments attained against
individual United States citizens abroad. Even if a foreign libel
plaintiff never tries to enforce his judgment here in the States, the
chilling effects on speech still remain. Therefore, courts require
this jurisdictional power to invalidate libel judgments that would
have never been rendered in a United States court. Courts need
the applicable power in order to convey to the world that the United
States strictly enforces First Amendment rights, and will not allow
these rights to be abridged by international forum shopping.

110 Thinkexist.com,
George Washington Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/
quotation/if_the_freedom_of_speech_is_taken_away_then_dumb/323858.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2010).
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